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ABSTRACT
Competition for order ﬂow can be characterized as a coordination game with mul-
tiple equilibria. Analyzing competition between dealer markets and a crossing net-
work, we show that the crossing network is more stable for lower traders’ disutilities
from unexecuted orders. By introducing private information, we prove existence
of a unique equilibrium with market consolidation. Assets with low volatility and
large volumes are traded on crossing networks, others on dealer markets. Eﬃciency
requires more assets to be traded on crossing networks. If traders’ disutilities diﬀer
suﬃciently, a unique equilibrium with market fragmentation exists. Low disutility
traders use the crossing network while high disutility traders use the dealer market.
The crossing network’s market share is ineﬃciently small.
1 Introduction
Intermarket competition for order ﬂow between trading venues is growing signiﬁ-
cantly. Key forces behind the increase in competition between markets and diﬀer-
ent market structures are the globalization and deregulation of ﬁnancial markets
as well as further advances in the automation of trading. Recent innovations in
trading technologies and a reduction in communication costs have strengthened the
popularity of alternative trading systems (ATSs), such as crossing networks (CNs)
and electronic communication networks (ECNs). ATSs oﬀer market participants the
possibility to meet directly without the intervention of an intermediary. In the U.S.,
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) led to a proliferation
of ATSs, in particular it allows ECNs to register as exchanges.1 This intensiﬁes
competition between existing markets and electronic trading venues even further.
In Europe, CNs such as PositUK and E–Crossnet have gained market share, and
an increasingly number of other initiatives is currently being considered by the in-
dustry, i.e. European brokers start to organize their own CNs to save transaction
costs. As there is no special regulatory status for ATSs in Europe, these CNs are
not surveyed by authorities.
1See Securities and Exchange Commission (1998); SEC Rule 17a gives ECNs the right to register
as stock exchanges; upon approval, ECNs would be self-regulated stock exchanges.
1ATSs attract order ﬂow away from existing exchanges by oﬀering lower commission
prices and the longest after-hours trading. ATSs, thus, increase intermarket com-
petition for order ﬂow. However, one of the major concerns with respect to multi-
market trading is the question of liquidity. In order to provide a liquid platform,
new trading venues must attract suﬃcient order ﬂow to ensure a high probability of
order execution.
This paper examines intermarket competition for order ﬂow between traditional
stock exchanges, i.e. dealer markets, and an electronic matching market. Trading
at established dealer markets guarantees immediate order execution at bid and ask
prices quoted by market makers. Trading at the electronic market is less expensive,
as traders do not have to pay for an intermediary’s services but only a small commis-
sion. However, the execution of an order submitted is uncertain. The probability of
execution depends on the number of orders submitted. As more traders direct their
orders to the electronic matching market, the probability of any particular order be-
ing matched against a counter order increases, raising the probability of execution
for all submitted orders and improving liquidity. This, in turn, attracts even more
traders to submit their orders to the electronic market.
Intermarket competition can be understood as a coordination game among traders.
If and only if many traders coordinate to trade on the electronic market the prob-
ability of order execution is high and expected payoﬀ from trading at this market
exceeds the payoﬀ from trading at dealer markets. Coordination failure would result
in the immediate failure of the new market due to a lack of liquidity. This raises
the question under which circumstances and for which sort of assets or commodities
electronic matching markets can co–exist with dealer markets or even replace them.
Related to these are the questions which parameters inﬂuence the traders’ decision
where to trade.
Theoretical research that addresses the question whether markets with diﬀerent mar-
ket structures and trading mechanisms can co–exist is rather limited. Most existing
market microstructure models analyze diﬀerent trading mechanisms in isolation.
There exists, however, some theoretical research that analyzes liquidity–based com-
petition for order ﬂow in models of multi–market trading that are close to our view
of intermarket competition as a coordination game. Pagano (1989), Gehrig (1993),
and most recently Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) analyze the interaction of
markets with a focus on the traders’ choice of trading venue. Market liquidity arises
endogenously as a result of the traders’ decision where to trade.2
2Glosten (1994) and Parlour and Seppi (1998) also address the question of the ability of markets
to co-exist. Glosten (1994) examines an idealized electronic limit order book and shows that it
does not invite competition from other markets while other markets do. Based on Glosten (1994),
Parlour and Seppi (1998) present a model of competition for order ﬂow between diﬀerent pairings of
pure limit order markets and hybrid specialist/limit order markets. These models jointly describe
2Pagano (1989) examines competition between two centralized markets and between
a centralized market and direct search for a trading partner. He focuses on the role
of heterogeneous traders’ beliefs about the actions of other traders and their impact
on markets’ performance. There is no intermediary but liquidity arises as a function
of scale. Depending on the transaction cost diﬀerential between markets, multiple
rational expectation equilibria arise. If markets have identical transaction costs, the
equilibrium in which both markets exist is unstable and trade will rather concentrate
on one of them. If markets diﬀer in transaction costs or the search mechanism there
may be either fragmentation or consolidation of trading, depending on the traders’
initial expectations about other traders’ decisions where to trade. When there is
fragmentation, smaller traders go to the less expensive but illiquid market and larger
traders to the more expensive but liquid market.3
Considering competition between a centralized market with an intermediary that
oﬀers guaranteed execution and a decentralized search market where heterogeneous
liquidity traders meet randomly and negotiate prices, Gehrig (1993) analyzes how
the intermediaries pricing behavior is aﬀected by the existence and eﬃciency of the
search market and the bargaining process in the search market. He shows that there
is an equilibrium in which traders with large gains from trade choose to trade with
the monopolistic intermediary while traders with low gains from trade enter the
search market. Here, both markets co–exist and order ﬂow is fragmented. However,
there are multiple equilibria depending on the traders’ initial beliefs about other
traders’ choice of venue.
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) study the interaction between a competitive
dealer market and a passive crossing network and analyze the impact of the intro-
duction of a CN on traders and the dealer market. While trading at the dealer
market is certain and expensive, trading at the CN is cheaper but uncertain and
entails waiting costs. In a rather complex model with diﬀerent types of hetero-
geneous liquidity and informed traders, they show that, in general, low liquidity
preference traders use the CN exclusively and traders with medium net gain use
the CN opportunistically, while high liquidity preference traders go to the dealer
market.
liquidity demand and supply by assuming diﬀerent types of traders who trade via diﬀerent order
types, i.e. liquidity suppliers are limit order traders and intermediaries, liquidity is demanded by
market order submitters. Viswanathan and Wang (1998) analyze the traders’ choice between a
limit-order book, a dealership market and a hybrid market structure of the two when traders diﬀer
in size and risk aversion.
3Similar to Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) analyze how the ability of traders to
choose where to trade aﬀects functioning and liquidity of markets in the presence of informational
asymmetries and liquidity traders in each market, who are not allowed to switch at another market.
They show that the market with the largest number of liquidity traders, who cannot move between
markets, attracts liquidity and informed traders, resulting in a concentration of trading in this
market.
3These models suggest that markets with diﬀerent trading costs and market struc-
tures may co–exist. They have one feature in common: there exist multiple equilibria
in each model resulting from a coordination problem among traders. Whether order
ﬂow is consolidated on one market or fragmented depends on the initial beliefs of
traders about other traders’ behavior. Given fragmentation of order ﬂow, a sud-
den change in the initial beliefs could result in traders switching markets and trade
concentrating on one single market. Multiple equilibria models do not allow com-
parative statics and analyses of the impact of alternative policies with respect to
multi–market trading.
Our paper presents an approach to examine the intermarket competition for order
ﬂow that allows to solve the coordination problem and remove indeterminacy. First,
we develop a model of liquidity–based competition between a pure dealer market and
a CN. Traders’ choices of market venues depend on transaction costs, probabilities
of order execution and expected losses from unexecuted orders. If the disutility
of unexecuted orders θ is the same for all traders and common knowledge among
them, multiple equilibria exist. We analyze and compare eﬃciency and stability
of these equilibria and calculate critical market shares that are necessary for a CN
to drive out dealer markets. Using the geometric distribution for the number of
traders, we show that there are three equilibria for most interesting values of θ with
market shares for the CN of zero, one, and some ˜ α(θ) strictly in between. The latter
equilibrium is highly unstable, so that we would not expect a CN to co–exist with
dealer markets.
Adopting an approach of Carlsson and van Damme (1993a,b) and Morris and Shin
(1998) who proved that small payoﬀ uncertainty can remove indeterminacy of equi-
libria in coordination games, we introduce noisy private information about the value
of trading. This results in traders being uncertain about the other traders’ decisions
where to trade. Instead of worsening the multiplicity problem, as one would expect
at ﬁrst sight, this uncertainty leads to an additional equilibrium restriction that
results in a considerable reduction in the number of equilibria and, under certain
conditions, in a unique equilibrium.
If the noise in private information on θ is suﬃciently small, there exists a unique
equilibrium with a threshold signal x∗ up to which agents place orders at the CN.
Agents who receive signals above x∗ trade at the dealer market. Threshold x∗
rises with rising bid–ask–spread at the dealer market, with rising market thickness
and with falling trading costs at the CN. Surprisingly, x∗ rises the more precise
the private information becomes. However, this eﬀect is too small to be exploited
by any speciﬁc information policy. The equilibrium is ineﬃcient as each agent’s
decision to use the CN has a positive externality on other users. The equilibrium
switching signal is lower than the eﬃcient switching signal. If the variance of private
4information approaches zero, almost all assets will be traded either at the CN or at
a dealer market. Hence, we would not expect both market venues to co–exist.
Finally, we allow disutilities of unexecuted orders to diﬀer across individuals. In
each equilibrium there is a threshold θ∗ such that all traders with lower disutilities
submit orders to the CN, while traders with higher disutilities trade at the dealer
market. There is a unique equilibrium, if disutilities have a uniform distribution
and spread far enough to have some traders for whom going to the dealer market is
a dominant strategy and a suﬃcient number of traders for whom going to the CN
is a dominant strategy. In this case dealer markets and a CN co–exist with market
shares being determined by the distribution of disutilities. If the equilibrium is
unique, the market share of the CN is ineﬃciently small.
The major achievement of our work is the removal of the multiplicity of equilibria in
the analysis of intermarket competition. We prove existence of a unique equilibrium
if traders have private information about θ or if private values θi are suﬃciently
diﬀerent. In contrast to models with multiple equilibria, our analysis provides a
deﬁnitive answer to the question whether markets can co–exist and order ﬂow is
fragmented or whether trading concentrates on a single market. If traders have
the same disutility from unexecuted orders, order ﬂow concentrates on one market.
While existing models cannot predict whether and on which market trade consoli-
dates, our model shows that assets with low price volatility and large turnovers are
traded at a CN, while assets with high volatility or small volumesare traded at dealer
markets. If disutilities diﬀer suﬃciently across individuals, both markets co–exist
and order ﬂow is fragmented. Traders with low disutilities use the CN and traders
with higher disutilities go to the dealer market. Our results are in line with exist-
ing literature; when there is fragmentation of order ﬂow, traders cluster together
according to their typical characteristics, i.e. their order size as in Pagano (1989)
or their liquidity preference as in Gehrig (1993) and Hendershott and Mendelson
(2000). While our model is closely related to the latter as we also analyze competi-
tion between a CN and dealer markets, we diﬀer from it in that we derive our results
by assuming one single type of traders like Pagano (1989) and Gehrig (1993).
In the next chapter, we introduce the basic market structure underlying our analysis.
Chapter 3 deals with the game with common knowledge of values of trade, chapter 4
analyses private information and chapter 5 lays out the game with private disutilities
of unexecuted orders. Chapter 6 gives conclusions and an outlook on future research.
52 Traders and Markets
There are exogenously given numbers of potential buyers Nb and sellers Ns that are
independently and identically distributed with prob(N = 0) > 0. In particular, we
assume a geometric distribution with E(N) = λ. Furthermore, we assume that all
agents have the same probability of being selected.
The geometric distribution follows from the idea that there is an inﬁnite set of agents
out of which potential buyers and sellers are selected randomly. With probability γ
a ﬁrst agent is selected as buyer. A second buyer is selected with probability γ if
and only if another buyer has been selected already. Thus, the probability of having
at least n buyers is γn. The total number of buyers Nb has a geometric distribution
with an expected number of λ =
γ
1−γ and prob(N) = (1 − γ)γN = λN
(1+λ)N+1. The
same procedure is applied to select sellers.
Agents do not know their position in the selection process. For any buyer the number
of additional buyers has the same geometric distribution with expected value λ. It
is a basic property of the geometric distribution that the conditional probability
of having k + N buyers, given that there are k buyers already, is the same as the
unconditional probability for N buyers. This property makes calculations easier and
allows to interpret potential buyers and sellers as small and without market power.
Each trader can decide to buy [sell] one unit of the one and only asset either at
market A or at market B. In the following sequel we distinguish two cases: either
agents decide for one of the two markets without knowing whether they will enter
this market as a buyer or seller, or agents are allowed to condition their choice on
the market side. Traders are risk neutral and maximize expected payoﬀ.
Market A is a dealer market (DM) where traders trade with market makers who set
bid and ask prices at which they are willing to buy or sell the asset. We assume
that bid and ask prices do not depend on the volume of trade. In particular, market
makers quote prices even if there are no traders at the DM. We normalize the mid–
point of bid and ask price to zero, so that traders can buy the asset at price tA and
sell at −tA, where tA is half of the bid–ask–spread and sometimes referred to as the
DM’s transaction fee.
Market B is an electronic crossing network (CN) which oﬀers purely transactional
services without any intervention by an intermediary and without price discovery.
Orders can be submitted to the CN as market orders and are executed at the mid–
point between bid and ask price observed at the DM, i.e. zero. If an order is executed
at the CN, the trader pays a small fee tB < tA.
6There may be an imbalance of orders on the two sides of market B, in which case the
excess side is rationed stochastically. In this case, one runs the risk of an order not
being executed. Orders on the excess side are randomly selected to match orders on
the short side. The probabilities with which orders are executed are determined by
the numbers of buyers and sellers who place their orders at the CN, nb and ns. The
probability of a buy order at the CN to be executed is
πb = min{1,ns/nb}. (1)
The probability of a sell order to be executed is
πs = min{1,nb/ns}. (2)
Unexecuted orders might be passed on to another trading system and executed
there at some later point in time possibly at diﬀerent costs. The loss in expected
payoﬀ from orders that are not executed instantaneously may depend on the costs
of passing orders to other trading venues, on expected price diﬀerentials, on the
length of the time interval until the order can be executed elsewhere, on the traders’
impatience or urgency to trade, and on the asset’s price volatility. We assume a
reduced form one–shot game, where unexecuted orders leave the trader with some
disutility θ ∈ [ˇ θ, ˆ θ]. Parameter θ is also referred to as value of trade, but it should not
be confused with the expected payoﬀ from carrying out a trade at all. θ essentially
is the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between trading now and having the choice to trade next
period.
The payoﬀ for a trader at the DM is θ −tA with certainty. At the CN the expected
payoﬀ is E((θ−tB)πb) for a potential buyer and E((θ−tB)πs) for a potential seller.
For simplicity of the exposition,4 we assume ˇ θ > tB.
The model and its parameters are assumed to be common knowledge. For the
disutility of unexecuted orders θ we consider three cases: First, we assume that all
traders face the same disutility θ if an order remains unexecuted. In the next chapter,
we assume in addition that θ is common knowledge. We see that this assumption
leads to multiple equilibria for a wide range of values. We then introduce small
noise in the observation of θ, so that agents only have private information about
this variable. One possible interpretation of the noise in observation may be that
traders cannot observe the realization of the underlying value θ but a noisy signal.
Traders are uncertain about the signals observed by others, but know that they are
in some surrounding of θ. Another interpretation may be that all traders receive
4If θ < tB, agents would prefer not to trade. This requires a third strategy “no trade” to be
considered, besides A and B. We veriﬁed that this would not alter our results.
7the same message with regard to θ but interpret this message diﬀerently. As a
result, traders’ expected values of trading are clustered round θ.5 We shall see that
uncertainty with private information creates an additional restriction that leads to a
unique equilibrium, if the variance of private information is suﬃciently small. Then,
there exists a threshold signal x∗ such that traders with smaller signals trade at the
CN while traders with higher signals go to the DM.
In a third part, we argue that the value of trade may diﬀer across individuals and
analyze equilibria of a game with private values of trade θi. The dispersion in private
values of trade may result from disparities in, for example, endowments or (time)
preferences across traders. In general, θi may be inﬂuenced by a trader’s liquidity
preference, her risk aversion, idiosyncratic beliefs or inside information. There is a
unique equilibrium if and only if private values are spread over a suﬃciently wide
range. The unique equilibrium is associated with a critical value θ∗, such that all
agents with smaller values place their orders at the CN, while agents with higher
values go to the DM.
3 Common Knowledge Game
The set of players in this game is [0,1]. A random process selects subsets of buyers
Nb and sellers Ns, whose ﬁnite sizes Nb and Ns are independently and identically
distributed. As explained before, we assume a geometric distribution with E(Nb) =
E(Ns) = λ > 0.
Assume that θ is common knowledge. An individual strategy is a function
a
i : [ˇ θ, ˆ θ] × {b,s} → {0,1}. (3)
ai(θ,b) = 1 means that agent i goes to market B if she is a buyer and the value of
trade is θ. If she is a seller, she goes to B iﬀ ai(θ,s) = 1. We allow for strategies to
depend on whether a player is selected as a buyer or a seller. Strategies may not,
however, depend on the sets Nb and Ns, as we assume that these sets are unknown to
traders when they choose a market. Even if θ is common knowledge and strategies
are mutually known, each trader faces some uncertainty about successful execution
of an order placed at market B, because the total number of buyers and sellers, Nb
and Ns, are unknown.
5For an illustration, one may think of θ being an indicator of exogenously given price volatility
of the traded asset. A high value of θ reﬂects high volatility and, because prices may change
quickly, a high urgency to trade with individual levels of urgency diﬀering around θ. A low value
of θ reﬂects a low volatility and, thus, a low demand for immediacy.
8Given a strategy combination a = (ai)i∈[0,1] and disutility θ, the proportions of
agents who submit orders to the CN if selected as buyers or sellers, respectively, are
αb(θ,a) =
Z 1
0
a
i(θ,b)di and αs(θ,a) =
Z 1
0
a
i(θ,s)di (4)
Lemma 1 Suppose a fraction αb of all traders goes to market B if selected as buyers
and a fraction αs of all traders goes to market B if selected as sellers. The probability
with which a buy order is executed is given by
Π(αb,αs) =
αs
αb
ln

1 +
αb λ
1 + αs λ

.
The probability of execution of a sell–order is Π(αs,αb), accordingly.
Proof see Appendix. Lemma 1 is a generalization of a result by Hendershott and
Mendelson (2000, Proposition 3, p. 2081).
The expected payoﬀ for a buyer with strategy ai, provided that others play strategy
combination a is given by
U
i
b(θ,a) = a
i(θ,b)(θ − tB)Π(αb(θ,a),αs(θ,a)) + (1 − a
i(θ,b))(θ − tA). (5)
Accordingly, the expected payoﬀ for a seller is
U
i
s(θ,a) = a
i(θ,s)(θ − tB)Π(αs(θ,a),αb(θ,a)) + (1 − a
i(θ,s))(θ − tA) (6)
and the expected payoﬀ of agent i is
U
i(θ,a) =
(
Ui
b(θ,a) if i ∈ Nb
Ui
s(θ,a) if i ∈ Ns.
(7)
Deﬁnition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the game with common knowledge of θ is a
strategy combination a∗ with6
U
i(θ,a
∗) ≥ U
i(θ,˜ a
i,a
∗−i) ∀θ, ∀˜ a
i, ∀i.
6By ˜ ai,a∗−i we denote a strategy combination a∗, where the strategy of player i has been
replaced by ˜ ai.
9In equilibrium a trader decides for B if expected gains at B exceed those at A. She
decides for A if it is the other way round. The expected payoﬀ of going to B instead
of A is
˜ Ub(θ,a) = (θ − tB)Π(αb,αs) − (θ − tA) (8)
for a buyer and for a seller accordingly
˜ Us(θ,a) = (θ − tB)Π(αs,αb) − (θ − tA). (9)
Using (5) to (9) it is straightforward that a strategy combination a∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if
a
∗i(θ,b) =

1 if ˜ Ub(θ,a∗) > 0
0 if ˜ Ub(θ,a∗) < 0
(10)
and
a
∗i(θ,s) =

1 if ˜ Us(θ,a∗) > 0
0 if ˜ Us(θ,a∗) < 0
(11)
To analyze equilibria, we ﬁrst show that the same proportions of buyers and sellers
submit orders to the CN.
Lemma 2 If a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the common knowledge game, then
αb(θ,a
∗) = αs(θ,a
∗) = α(θ,a
∗) for all θ.
Proof Let a∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Suppose αb(θ,a∗) > αs(θ,a∗) for some θ. Then
Π(αb,αs) < Π(αs,αb) and ˜ Ub(θ,a∗) < ˜ Us(θ,a∗). On the other hand, αb(θ,a∗) >
αs(θ,a∗) implies αb(θ,a∗) > 0 and αs(θ,a∗) < 1 and therefore ˜ Ub(θ,a∗) ≥ 0 and
˜ Us(θ,a∗) ≤ 0. This is a contradiction to the inequality above. Therefore, αb(θ,a∗) =
αs(θ,a∗) ∀θ. QED
Associated with each Nash equilibrium a∗ is a market share for the CN of α(θ,a∗)
The probability of order execution is
˜ π(α) = ln

1 +
αλ
1 + αλ

. (12)
˜ π is strictly increasing in α up to
¯ π = ˜ π(1) = ln

1 +
λ
1 + λ

< 0.7. (13)
10Proposition 1 A strategy combination a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game with
common knowledge if and only if
αb(θ,a∗) = αs(θ,a∗) = 1 for θ ∈ (tB,tA),
αb(θ,a∗) = αs(θ,a∗) ∈ {0, ˜ α(θ),1} for θ ∈ [tA,θ0],
αb(θ,a∗) = αs(θ,a∗) = 0 for θ > θ0,
where θ0 =
tA−¯ π tB
1−¯ π and ˜ α(θ) = ˜ π−1

θ−tA
θ−tB

= 1
λ
exp

θ−tA
θ−tB

−1
2−exp

θ−tA
θ−tB
.
Proof see Appendix. Nash equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1.
. Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 1 Nash equilibria of the common knowledge game. For tB = 1, tA = 2 and
λ = 15, θ0 = 3.953.
Equilibrium strategies are individually optimal at each value of trade θ, given that
all other agents play the strategies of the same equilibrium.
If θ < tA, agents would loose from trading at market A, but for θ ≥ ˇ θ > tB,
they proﬁt from trading at market B. Here, a∗i(θ,b) = a∗i(θ,s) = 1 is a dominant
strategy and the only equilibrium.
11For θ = tA there are two equilibria: in equilibrium A, all agents go to the DM where
they receive nothing. This is a Nash equilibrium because a single trader cannot
gain from switching to market B. Without a trading partner her order would not
be executed. But any coalition with at least one trader on each side of the market
could improve upon their payoﬀs by switching to B.
In equilibrium B, all agents go to the CN where they expect positive gains from
trade. Equilibrium B is a strong equilibrium7 where any coalition would loose by
switching to market A.
If θ exceeds tA, agents would still prefer to trade at market B since it is cheaper.
However, there is uncertainty about the execution of an order at B; at market A
gains are lower but certain. If all traders go to market A, a single trader who
switches to B will face probability zero of her order to be executed and hence loose
her gains from trade. Therefore, it is an equilibrium if all traders go to A.
If all agents place orders at market B, the probability of successful order execution
is high. Agents get the reward from the transaction and save transaction costs with
high probability. At market A it is guaranteed that they get a small reward θ − tA.
If this reward is suﬃciently small, it is more than compensated by the higher reward
at B with positive probability. Thus, there is a B–equilibrium for some θ > tA.
From equation (12) we know that the probability of order execution at the CN rises
in its market share. However, even if all agents place their orders at market B, the
probability of successful execution is bounded below 1. The probability that there
is a lack of trading partners is prob(Nb > Ns) > 0. There is a positive probability to
be rationed. Hence, there is a θ0 > tA such that for θ > θ0 it pays to go to market
A, even if all other agents go to B. That is to say, for larger values of trade going
to A is the only equilibrium.
For smaller trading values θ ∈ [tA,θ0] going to B is an equilibrium, because expected
payoﬀ at market B is higher than at A if all traders go to B. θ0 is determined by the
equality of expected payoﬀs at both markets for the maximal probability of order
execution ¯ π. Expected payoﬀ on market B is (θ − tB) ¯ π. A trader going to market
A gets a payoﬀ θ − tA. This does not exceed the expected payoﬀ on market B iﬀ
θ ≤ θ0.
Market shares of zero and one for either of the two markets are equilibria for θ ∈
[tA,θ0]. However, the relative stability of these equilibria changes in θ.
7A strategy combination a∗ is a strong equilibrium if
Ui(θ,a∗) ≥ Ui  
θ,(˜ ai)i∈K,(a∗i)i6∈K

∀θ ∀˜ a ∀K ⊆ N.
12With rising θ the A–equilibrium becomes stronger as coalitions of growing size are
needed to improve their payoﬀs by switching to B and to create an execution proba-
bility that outweighs certainty of the lower gain at A. For θ ≥ θ0, the A–equilibrium
is strong and cannot be improved upon by any coalition.
The B–equilibrium is always strong up to θ0. However, there is a relative strength
of the B–equilibrium that declines with θ above tA: smaller coalitions could be
attracted to market A. They would loose relative to the B–equilibrium but after
their change in strategy, market size at B would be too small to re–attract single
traders as the expected payoﬀ at A would now exceed that at B. The triggering
coalition would require a compensation for the lower payoﬀs at A.
Strength of A and relative weakness of B are logically the same. The size of the
marginal coalition necessary to raise the expected payoﬀ at B over the gain at A
and induce agents to switch from an A–equilibrium to B is equal to the one that
must remain at B to prevent A from being more attractive than B after the drain.
The strength of the A–equilibrium is more direct than that of B. Any CN that is
successful in coordinating a suﬃcient proportion of strategies can intrude a DM–
monopoly. To intrude a CN–monopoly, dealer(s) would have to compensate all
traders by fees lower than tA until the CN is so drained out that lower transaction
costs do not compensate for execution risk and the DM is more attractive even with
fee tA.
In addition to the pure A– and B–equilibrium, there is a mixed equilibrium at which
both markets co–exist with a market share for the CN of ˜ α(θ) that decreases from
one to zero as θ rises from tA to θ0. In this equilibrium, the size of the market share
of B just generates an execution probability for which expected payoﬀs at A and
B equal each other, so that no agent wants to switch. If expected payoﬀs are the
same on both markets, traders on market B cannot gain from switching to A. On
the other hand, a single trader, say buyer, who switches from A to B, would reduce
E(πb) and, thus, would expect smaller gains from trade at market B.
Mixed equilibrium market share ˜ α(θ) is given by
˜ Ub(θ, ˜ α) = 0 ⇔ ˜ π(˜ α)(θ − tB) = (θ − tA) ⇔ ˜ α(θ) = ˜ π
−1

θ − tA
θ − tB

. (14)
The mixed equilibrium is very weak. Expected payoﬀs are the same on both markets
and any coalition with at least one trader on each side of the market can improve
their payoﬀs by switching from A to B. But instability of the mixed equilibrium is
asymmetric. Agents who go to the CN in a mixed equilibrium have no incentive to
13form a deviating coalition, as they cannot gain by switching to the DM. Once a CN
has a market share of ˜ α(θ), one should expect that it takes over the whole market.
Market share ˜ α(θ) is also the minimal size of a coalition that is needed to induce
agents to switch from an A–equilibrium to market B and establish a CN that oﬀers
higher expected payoﬀs than the DM. As expected, critical mass ˜ α rises in θ and
tB and falls in tA, as these changes reduce the cost advantage of tA − tB relative
to the value of trading θ. A rise in the expected number of traders λ, i.e. rising
“thickness” of the market, increases probability of order execution and makes the
CN more attractive. This lowers ˜ α(θ).
With respect to the situation where existing DMs face upcoming electronic CNs, we
suggest the following interpretation: the lower the value of immediate trade θ, the
easier is it to intrude the market with a CN. Intrusion is possible only if θ ≤ θ0.
For θ > θ0 agents trade at the DM exclusively. While it is increasingly easy for
an intruding CN to win the market when θ goes down, it becomes more and more
costly for market makers to re–attract order ﬂow. To convince traders to return to
the DM, they must be compensated for higher bid–ask spreads. This, in turn, is
costly for market makers. It pays for the DM to protect itself against attempts to
establish a CN–monopoly. A CN may fail to enter the market if its market share
stays below the critical value ˜ α(θ).
For θ ≥ θ0, the A–equilibrium is eﬃcient. The B–equilibrium is eﬃcient if θ ≤ θ0.
It operates at lower costs and for θ < θ0 this cost advantage is more valuable to
agents than the execution risk. Risk at market B is minimized when all agents go
there.
Equilibrium market shares are the same if we restrict agents to strategies for which
the market choice can only depend on θ, but not on the market side. In other
words, multiplicity of equilibria does not depend on the consideration of asymmetric
strategies.
For trading values θ ∈ [tA,θ0] multiple equilibria exist. Although these equilibria
diﬀer in strength, it is not possible to predict at which market trade consolidates.
With multiple Nash equilibria, it is even possible that diﬀerent agents play strate-
gies belonging to diﬀerent equilibria, so that played strategies do not form a Nash
equilibrium at all. This opens another way for co–existing DM and CN, besides
mixed equilibria. Mixed equilibria are extremely unstable and strategy combina-
tions that are no Nash equilibrium will not survive in the long run either. We would
therefore not expect to observe co–existence of DMs and a CN when θ is the same
for all agents and common knowledge. The existence of multiple equilibria is con-
sistent with other models when considering the ability of markets to co–exist. For
examples, see Pagano (1989), Gehrig (1993), Parlour and Seppi (1998), Hendershott
14and Mendelson (2000), as well as related work examining markets with positive
externalities as for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985).
4 Private Information Game
Suppose that traders do not know a trade’s exact value θ. Suppose, they each get a
private signal xi, but are uncertain about θ. When there is uncertainty about θ, there
is also uncertainty about the signals of other agents. Even if strategies are known,
the actual behavior of other agents is uncertain to each trader. This uncertainty
creates an additional restriction for equilibria that can be used to eliminate strategies
that are equilibria under common knowledge of θ.
Given θ, signals xi are independently and identically distributed. We assume that
E(θ|xi) rises with rising xi. For means of exposition, we assume that xi has a
uniform distribution in [θ−,θ+] and θ has a uniform distribution in [ˇ θ, ˆ θ], so that
for ˇ θ +  < xi < ˆ θ −  the posterior distribution of θ conditional on xi is uniform in
an –surrounding of xi. Furthermore, we assume that ˇ θ+ < tA, so there are signals
below tA for which E(θ|xi) = xi. Here, agent i’s expected proﬁt from executed
trade is xi minus transaction costs.
An individual strategy is a function ai : R → {0,1}. ai(xi) = 1 [0] means that agent
i goes to market B [A] if her signal is xi.
We think of traders choosing the market irrespective of their wish to buy or sell
the asset. They decide on the market depending on their signal before they are
selected as buyers or sellers. This must be taken into account for any interpretation
of equilibria. The market that we consider has the same people trading on both
sides. This may be a suitable assumption for many asset markets, but not for all.
It is most certainly not appropriate for product markets, where buyers and sellers
are ﬁrms of diﬀerent branches, for retail markets or markets with participants who
exercise market power.
Denote the conditional density of signal xi for given disutility θ by f(xi |θ). The
proportion of players who go to the CN if selected as buyers or sellers is
α(θ,a) =
Z ∞
−∞
Z 1
0
f(x
i |θ)a
i(x
i) di dx
i. (15)
The probability of order execution at the CN when the value of trade is θ and when
agents play a strategy combination a is
π(θ,a) = ˜ π(α(θ,a)). (16)
15The expected payoﬀ for agent i going to market B instead of A is
˜ U(x
i,a) = E((θ − tB)π(θ,a) − θ + tA | x
i). (17)
4.1 Dominated Strategies
To start analysis of this game, we need some regions in which going to either market
is a dominated strategy. It is easy to conceive that there are signals so bad that the
expected value of trade is smaller than tA and other signals so good that expected
gains from trade exceed θ0. As this depends on the probability space, we formally
assume the existence of signals x0, ¯ x0 in the interior of the signal space, for which
E(θ|x
0) = tA and E(θ| ¯ x
0) = θ0, (18)
so that for all strategies a, ˜ U(xi,a) is positive for some xi < x0 and negative for
xi > ¯ x0. Given the uniform distribution of values of trade and signals as described
above, x0 = tA and ¯ x0 = θ0.
Using (17), we ﬁnd
˜ U(x
i,a) > 0 ∀a ⇔ tA − E(θ|x
i) > 0 ⇔ x
i < x
0.
Thus, for an agent who gets signal xi < x0, it is a dominant strategy to go to market
B. The intuitive reason for this is that the trader expects a positive reward at B
with some probability that depends on the strategies of other agents. Since ˇ θ > tB
the agent cannot loose money at B, while the expected reward at A is negative.
Using (17) again, we ﬁnd
˜ U(x
i,a) < 0 ∀a ⇔ tA − ¯ π tB − (1 − ¯ π)E(θ|x
i) < 0 ⇔ x
i > ¯ x
0.
Thus, for an agent who gets signal xi > ¯ x0, it is a dominant strategy to go to
market A. The strategy proﬁle that would give a buyer the highest incentive to go
to B is given when all traders go to B. The probability of success in this case is
¯ π < 1, as described in the previous section. An agent who gets signal ¯ x0 and has
the optimistic belief ¯ π is indiﬀerent between the two markets. For higher signals,
the expected value of trade is so big that certainty of execution at A outweighs the
lower costs at B even for the highest possible execution probability at that market.
16If agent i gets a signal xi ∈ (x0, ¯ x0), her payoﬀ from going to B instead of A may
be positive or negative, depending on the strategies of other players. There is no
dominant strategy for these intermediate signals.
Traders are rational and do not play a dominated strategy. Hence, all agents who get
signals below x0 go to market B and agents who get signals above ¯ x0 go to market
A. As we assume that traders know that others are rational, each agent concludes
that the others will not play a dominated strategy. This gives an additional insight
that can be used to eliminate even more strategies.
4.2 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
As rationality is common knowledge an agent will not play a strategy that is dom-
inated if she considers only those strategies of other players that have not been
eliminated yet. Starting with k = 0, at step k+1 agents consider only the strategies
that assign B to signals below xk and A to signals above ¯ xk.
In this game, market choices are strategic complements. The more agents that decide
for market B the higher is the incentive for each agent to go to the same market.
After eliminating dominated strategies, the best [worst] thing that can happen to a
potential trader on market B is that all other potential traders who have signals in
[xk, ¯ xk] go to market B [A]. This maximizes [minimizes] the probability of execution
of an order at market B. So, the best [worst] strategy combination that an agent
at step k + 1 must consider is given when all other agents play strategy I¯ xk [Ixk].
Deﬁne a strategy Iy by
Iy(x
i) =

1 if xi ≤ y
0 if xi > y. (19)
In other words, an agent playing this strategy goes to market B if and only if her
signal is not bigger than y.
It is a dominant strategy to go to market B whenever the lowest expected return
there exceeds the certain return at A, i.e. ˜ U(xi,Ixk) > 0. This is the case when
xi < xk+1, deﬁned by
x
k+1 = inf{x| ˜ U(x,Ixk) = 0}. (20)
17If the highest expected return from B is lower than the gain at A, it is a dominant
strategy to go to market A. This happens for xi > ¯ xk+1, deﬁned by
¯ x
k+1 = sup{x| ˜ U(x,I¯ xk) = 0}. (21)
˜ U(x,Ik) rises in k. Since xk < ¯ xk, we have xk+1 < ¯ xk+1. If rationality is common
knowledge, players go to market B if they get signals below xk, and they go to A if
their signals exceed ¯ xk for any k.
Common knowledge of rationality takes this procedure to the limits, where a trader
with signal xi will always go to market B if xi < x∞ = limk→∞ xk and always go to
market A if xi > ¯ x∞ = limk→∞ ¯ xk. Sequences xk and ¯ xk are monotone and bounded,
so that limit points exist and are given by
x∞ = inf{x| ˜ U(x,Ix) = 0}
¯ x∞ = sup{x| ˜ U(x,Ix) = 0},
(22)
where
˜ U(x,Ix) = E((θ − tB) ˜ π(F(x|θ)) − θ + tA |x) (23)
and F(x|θ) is he cumulative density of signal x given value of trade θ. x∞ and ¯ x∞
characterize the set of rationalizable strategies.
Proposition 2 A rationalizable strategy of the game with private information about
θ is a strategy a∗ with
a∗(xi) = 1 for xi < x∞
a∗(xi) ∈ {0,1} for xi ∈ [x∞, ¯ x∞]
a∗(xi) = 0 for xi > ¯ x∞.
Since we have strategic complements, we know from Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
that the range of rationalizable strategies is limited by Nash equilibria. Indeed,
it is easy to see that Ix∞ and I¯ x∞ are Nash equilibria of the private information
game. Since all Nash equilibria are rationalizable, there is no Nash equilibrium
where agents go to market A for signals below x∞ or to B for signals above ¯ x∞.
Limit points x∞ and ¯ x∞ are the smallest and the biggest solution of equation
˜ U(x,Ix) = 0. In general, this equation may have several solutions, so that we are
18left with multiple equilibria, although we could clearly reduce the set of disutilities
with unpredictable outcomes in comparison to the game with common knowledge.
However, if ˜ U(x,Ix) is monotone in x, there would be only one solution: a unique
equilibrium. Signals enter this function in two ways. The partial derivative of ˜ U
with respect to x is negative. An increase in x increases expected return at B at
a marginal rate that equals execution probability π < 0.7. Expected returns at A
are certain and, therefore, rise at a marginal rate of 1. If execution probability is
not aﬀected, an increase in x lowers the expected payoﬀ of going to B instead of A
at a rate 1 − π. On the other hand, an increase in the switching point up to which
traders go to market B may change the probabilities of order execution in a way
that depends on the assumed probability distributions. This eﬀect may be positive
and could even exceed the negative partial derivative. Hence, the net eﬀect depends
on the probability distributions, as does multiplicity of rationalizable strategies. For
uniform distribution of values of trade and signals the latter eﬀect vanishes, because
agents always attribute the same probability to other signals being higher or lower
than their own.
Theorem 1 For uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, there is a signal
x∗, such that any rationalizable strategy assigns market B to signals below x∗ and
market A to signals above x∗. x∗ is the unique solution to
˜ U(x
∗,Ix∗) =
Z 1
0
(x
∗ +  − 2α − tB) ˜ π(α)dα − x
∗ + tA = 0. (24)
Proof see Appendix. Given uniform distribution, there is a critical signal x∗, such
that agents with lower signals use the CN, while agents with higher signals go to
the DM.
The intuitive explanation of the existence of a unique equilibrium under uncertainty
about θ is the following. The noise of the signal eliminates common knowledge
about θ. A trader observing a private signal knows neither the true value of θ,
nor does she know which signals other traders have obtained. However, traders
are known to be rational and to take certain actions at certain information sets,
i.e. dominant strategies exist for signals x < x0 and x > ¯ x0, respectively. The
knowledge that traders do not employ dominant strategies results in a unique best
response for traders who, based on the observations of their private signals, believe
that other traders have observed signals x < x0 or x > ¯ x0, respectively, and play
a dominant strategy. The unique best response is to follow the same action as it
oﬀers a higher expected payoﬀ. These traders’ best responses, in turn, inﬂuence the
responses of other traders, who believe that some traders believe that others have
observed signals x < x0 or x > ¯ x0, respectively, and so on. If this infection argument
19results in a unique action proﬁle, as it does for uniform distribution of θ and signals,
a unique equilibrium is obtained. Clearly, higher order beliefs and the existence of
dominant strategies are the key factors in determining a unique equilibrium.
In the common knowledge game, payoﬀs are certain in equilibrium. In the private
information game, the actual behavior of traders and payoﬀs is uncertain due to
the lack of common knowledge. Traders need to take into account potential losses
from trading at the CN instead of trading at the DM in case the order submitted
to the CN remains unexecuted. They weigh expected gains from trading at the CN
determined by the probability of order execution against certain gains from trading
at the DM. At the equilibrium switching signal x∗, expected gains at both markets
are equal. This is an additional equilibrium restriction that enables us to eliminate
strategies that are equilibria in the common knowledge game.
A trader i who receives signal x∗ attaches equal probability to all values of θ within
[x∗ − ,x∗ + ]. If all traders who receive signals lower than x∗ choose the CN, the
proportion of traders at the CN is α(θ,Ix∗) = x∗−θ+
2 ∈ [0,1] and the execution
probability is π∗ = E(π(θ,Ix∗) | x∗). For trader i the expected gain at the CN R x∗+
x∗− (θ − tB)π(θ,Ix∗)dθ just compensates x∗ − tA (see Figure 2).
As the proof of Theorem 1 shows, with uniform distribution of values of trade and
signals, the probability of order execution at signal x∗ does not change with rising
. It is given by
π
∗ = E(π(θ,Ix∗)|x
∗) =
Z 1
0
˜ π(α)dα. (25)
Corollary 1 Given uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, as  goes to
zero, the critical signal x∗ approaches
x
∗
0 =
tA − π∗ tB
1 − π∗ .
Proof As  approaches zero, (24) shows that
˜ U(x
∗,Ix∗) → (x
∗ − tB)π
∗ − x
∗ + tA = 0.
Solving for x∗ gives the equation in Corollary 1. QED
When  approaches zero, uncertainty about the value of trade vanishes. But, as
Morris and Shin (1997, 1998) have argued, with positive  there is never common
20knowledge that the value of trade is contained in any strict subset Θ ⊂ [ˇ θ, ˆ θ]. For  >
0 there is always uncertainty about higher beliefs. The lack of common knowledge,
even for arbitrarily small  is a fundamental diﬀerence to the previous game, and
it is for this reason that reducing  does not lead to an approximation of the Nash
equilibria in the common knowledge game.
. Insert Figure 2 here
Figure 2 Nash equilibrium of the private information game. Agents switch markets
at signal x∗, where the expected payoﬀ from trading at the CN equals the certain
21payoﬀ from trading at the DM, i.e. the areas A and B are of equal size. For tB = 1,
tA = 2, λ = 15 and  = 0.1, θ0 = 3.953, x∗ = 3.434 and x∗
0 = 3.445.
If the distribution of θ is not uniform, there may be multiple equilibria. However,
Morris and Shin (2000) have shown that for a quite general class of symmetric
coordination games with binary choices equilibria approach a single strategy proﬁle
that does not depend on higher moments of the probability distribution as the
variance of private information approaches zero.8
It is easy to check that our game satisﬁes the conditions required for this result. It
follows that for any continuous probability distribution of values of trade and signals,
as the variance of private information approaches zero, all agents with signals below
x∗
0 place orders at the CN, while agents with signals above x∗
0 go to the DM.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium allows us to do some comparative statics on (24):
Corollary 2 Given uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, the critical
signal x∗ rises with rising tA or λ and with falling tB for any  > 0. A rise in 
lowers x∗.
Proof see Appendix.
The higher x∗, the larger the unconditional expected market share of the CN is. In
our leading example, this share is prob(xi < x∗) = x∗−ˇ θ
ˆ θ−ˇ θ . However, it cannot be
concluded that a CN should take eﬀorts to reduce  in order to increase its market
share, because the eﬀect of  on x∗ is very small.
Corollary 3 Given uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, for all  > 0,
x
∗
0 −
π∗
1 − π∗  < x
∗ < x
∗
0.
Proof see Appendix.
This shows that precision of private information has no big impact on x∗. Since
π∗
1−π∗ < 7
3, a reduction in  raises x∗ by a magnitude in the order of the change in
. So even for positive , the equilibrium threshold is close to x∗
0. This is especially
important as x∗
0 is much easier to calculate than x∗.
8More generally, Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2000) have shown that a large class of global
games with strategic complementarities has equilibria converging towards a single strategy proﬁle
as the noise in private information approaches zero.
22Given θ, the market share of the CN is F(x∗ |θ), where F is the cumulative distri-
bution of signals. If θ < x∗ − , all traders get signals below x∗ and choose to trade
at the CN. If θ > x∗ + , all traders get signals above x∗ and trade at the DM. For
θ ∈ [x∗ − ,x∗ + ] the market share of the CN is x∗−θ+
2 . As  approaches zero, the
CN’s market share approaches 1 [0] for θ < [>]x∗
0.
Both markets co–exist if θ ∈ [x∗−,x∗+]. However, this is an event with probability
2
ˆ θ−ˇ θ that is very small and approaches zero for  → 0. Hence, we would expect to
observe co–existence of both market forms only for very few assets.
In comparison to the results of the common knowledge game, we see that uncer-
tainty about the value of trade destabilizes a DM monopoly for low values of trade.
Uncertainty makes it easier to coordinate on a CN, because traders believe that
others might believe that some traders go to the CN anyway. Accordingly, there is
a positive execution probability that is suﬃcient to attract some traders who know
that the value of trade is above tA.
For high values of θ up to θ0, a CN could win the market provided that θ is common
knowledge. Although this is a strong equilibrium, the CN would loose the market
again as soon as the value of trade becomes uncertain. If a DM oﬀers new services
that create uncertainty in the observation of θ, it can hinder traders to coordinate on
the CN and, thus, prevent intrusion or can win back the market at low costs. In fact,
this is much cheaper than winning back market shares under common knowledge,
where some traders must be compensated for the initial loss they face when switching
from the strong B–equilibrium in the common knowledge game.
In the common knowledge game, the B–equilibrium is eﬃcient whenever θ < θ0.
In the private information game, eﬃcient strategy combinations coordinate trade
at the CN up to a signal k∗ that is close to θ0. The eﬃcient switching signal k∗
maximizes E(Ui(Ik)) over k.
Proposition 3 Given uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, the eﬃ-
cient strategy combination in the private information game is Ik∗, where
k
∗ = θ0 − 
¯ π − 2
R 1
0 α ˜ π(α)dα
1 − ¯ π
< θ0. (26)
Proof see Appendix. Proposition 3 shows that the eﬃcient switching signal in the
private information game is smaller than θ0 up to which it is eﬃcient to place orders
at market B in the common knowledge game. However, the deviation from θ0 is
smaller than ¯ π
1−¯ π  < 7
3  and disappears for  → 0, while x∗ converges to x∗
0 < θ0.
23Theorem 2 Given uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, the unique
equilibrium switching signal x∗ is smaller than the eﬃcient switching signal k∗.
Proof see Appendix. For uniform distribution, the equilibrium switching signal x∗
is smaller than k∗ and hence, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Reason are network
externalities that arise from strategic complementarities. Agents should use the CN
at signals at which, in equilibrium, they do not use it, because the decision to go to
the CN increases expected payoﬀ also for other users of the CN. The externality is
not accounted for by individual decisions. This can be used to argue that CNs and
other electronic market places need public support to overcome ineﬃciencies.
5 Private Value Game
In this chapter we assume that values of trade diﬀer across individuals. Each agent
i has a private value of trade θi ≥ tB. The distribution of private values is deﬁned
by a density function f(θi). To simplify exposition, we identify agents with their
private values, i.e. i = θi.
Each trader knows her private value of trade and distribution f. However, she
does not know how many traders are selected as buyers and sellers and what their
private values are. Traders for both market sides are selected according to the
random process described in the previous chapters. After selection, a trader decides
on which market she places her order. A strategy is a function ai : {b,s} → {0,1},
where ai(b) = 1 means that trader i goes to the CN if she is selected as buyer.
Let αb(a) [αs(a)] be the expected proportion of traders who go to market B if they
are selected as buyers [sellers]. For any given strategy combination a, the probability
of execution is πb(a) = Π(αb(a),αs(a)) for a buy order and πs(a) = Π(αs(a),αb(a))
for a sell order.
Execution probabilities do not depend on any value of trade θ in contrast to the
previous game. Here, there is a given distribution of private values θi that are aﬃxed
to traders, so that for any strategy combination expected probabilities of order
execution only depend on the proportions of buyers and sellers going to market B.
In particular, execution probabilities are the same for all traders and do not depend
on θi.
Given strategy combination a, the expected payoﬀ for trader i is
U(θ
i,a) =
(
ai(b)(θi − tB)πb(a) + (1 − ai(b))(θi − tA) for i ∈ Nb
ai(s)(θi − tB)πs(a) + (1 − ai(s))(θi − tA) for i ∈ Ns.
(27)
24Deﬁnition 2 A Nash equilibrium of the game with private values of trade is a
strategy combination a∗ with
U(θ
i,a
∗) ≥ U(θ
i,˜ a
i,a
∗−i) ∀˜ a
i ∀i.
To characterize equilibria of this game, we start by deﬁning excess utilities for going
to market B instead of A,
˜ Ub(θ
i,a) = (θ
i − tB)πb(a) − (θ
i − tA), (28)
˜ Us(θ
i,a) = (θ
i − tB)πs(a) − (θ
i − tA). (29)
Since probabilities of order execution are bounded below 1, ˜ Ub and ˜ Us are strictly
decreasing in θi for any strategy combination a. Using this property, we can show
that in each equilibrium there is a value θ∗ < θ0 such that all agents with private
values below θ∗ place their orders at the CN, while agents with private values above
θ∗ trade at the DM.
Lemma 3 If a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the private value game, there is a unique
θ∗(a∗) ∈ [tA,θ0], such that
a
∗i(b) = a
∗i(s) =

1 if θi < θ∗(a∗)
0 if θi > θ∗(a∗)
Proof see Appendix.
The associated proportion of agents who place orders at the CN is given by α∗ =
F(θ∗), where F is the cumulative distribution of private values. The probability of
order execution is ˜ π(α∗), and excess utility from going to B instead of A is
ˆ U(θ
∗) = (θ
∗ − tB) ˜ π(F(θ
∗)) − (θ
∗ − tA). (30)
In equilibrium ˆ U(θ∗) = 0, and any strategy combination, where agents go to B iﬀ
their private values are smaller than θ∗, is a Nash equilibrium if ˆ U(θ∗) = 0.
Theorem 3 If private values have a uniform distribution in [tB, ˆ θ] and ˆ θ > θ0 and
tA−tB
ˆ θ−tB λ ≥ 1
2, the private value game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
25Proof see Appendix.
For a unique equilibrium, there must be a suﬃcient mass of agents with private
values below tA. Theorem 3 requires that the expected number of these agents is
at least 1/2. This guarantees a minimal probability of order execution ˜ π(
tA−tB
ˆ θ−tB ) ≥
ln(4/3) ≈ 0.288. Given this probability at the lower end of [tA,θ0], the increase in
π that is associated with a rising threshold value θ is too weak to compensate for
the increasing disadvantage of B stemming from uncertainty of gain θ.
If disutilities of unexecuted orders diﬀer suﬃciently between traders to have some
traders for whom going to the DM is a dominant strategy and a suﬃcient mass of
traders for whom going to the CN is a dominant strategy, then there is a unique
equilibrium with a threshold θ∗ such that all traders with lower disutilities place
orders at the CN while traders with higher values go to the DM. Under these con-
ditions, both market types co–exist. The market share of the CN rises with rising
tA and falling tB. Figure 3 illustrates a unique Nash equilibrium.
Insert Figure 3 here
Figure 3 Nash equilibrium of the private value game. An intersection of the two
curves at θ∗ represents a Nash equilibrium if all agents with private values below θ∗
go to B and agents with private values above θ∗ go to A. For tB = 1, tA = 2, λ = 15
and ˆ θ = 10, θ0 = 3.953 and θ∗ = 3.433.
If the distribution of private values is such that θi ∈ (tA,θ0) with probability one,
there are at least three Nash equilibria with properties comparable to the equilibria
26in the common knowledge game: either trade concentrates on one of the two markets
or both markets co–exist and order ﬂow is fragmented, with trader i going to market
A [B] if θi > [<]θ∗, where ˆ U(θ∗) = 0.
If there are three equilibria, the ‘mixed’ equilibrium is weak. A coalition of agents
with positive mass and private values slightly higher than θ∗ can improve by switch-
ing from A to B. The A-equilibrium is robust against deviations of small coalitions
and the B-equilibrium is strong. If there are multiple equilibria, the one with the
largest market share for the CN Pareto–dominates the others. If θi ∈ [tA,θ0) for all
i, only the B–equilibrium is eﬃcient.
If there is a unique equilibrium, for example under conditions of Theorem 3, it cor-
responds to the ‘mixed’ equilibrium in the common knowledge game and is strong.
No coalition can improve by changing strategies. Eﬃciency depends on whether
private values are assigned to agents randomly or whether these values are inherent
properties of agents’ preferences. In the latter case, and if utility is not transfer-
able across agents, any allocation diﬀerent from equilibrium reduces expected payoﬀ
for some agents. If execution risks can be hedged, payoﬀ is transferable and the
eﬃcient threshold θ∗∗ maximizes the sum of individual payoﬀs, weighted with re-
spective probabilities of the agents’ participation as given by density function f.
The same holds if private values are randomly assigned to agents. Here, f is the
density function of the private value for each agent. Again, the eﬃcient threshold
θ∗∗ maximizes expected payoﬀ with respect to distribution f. Deﬁne
θ
∗∗ = argmax
k
E(U(θ
i,a
i
k)), where a
i
k = 1 iﬀ θ
i ≥ k. (31)
Theorem 4 If the private value game has a unique equilibrium, the associated
threshold θ∗ is smaller than θ∗∗.
Proof see Appendix.
In the private information game, we saw that assets are traded at a DM that would
be more eﬃciently traded at a CN. Here, we get a similar result: The market share
of the CN is ineﬃciently small. Traders with private values of trade between θ∗ and
θ∗∗ give their orders to the DM. If they would go to the CN instead, the overall
gains of all traders induced by higher liquidity of the CN exceed the losses that
those traders must expect at the CN whose values are closest to θ∗∗.
Results of this game are related to Gehrig (1993), who also showed that traders
with a low liquidity preference choose direct trading instead of trading with an
intermediary. Gehrig’s (1993) model diﬀers from ours in that he does not consider
27a CN, but traders must search for partners by themselves and matching occurs
with rather low probability. Thus, execution probability is bounded above far from
unity. In Gehrig’s model, a whole continuum of traders is active on both sides of
the market. Hence, there is no uncertainty about market size. Introducing a CN
in Gehrig’s model would guarantee multiple equilibria, and execution probability
at the CN would either be zero or one. Uncertainty in Gehrig (1993) stems from
the search process, while in our model uncertainty is due to the random selection
of active traders. In both models, the probability of order execution at the direct
market is limited — a crucial feature for uniqueness of the critical value θ∗ that
divides customers of the two markets. In equilibrium, uncertainty of order execution
is a result of the market mechanism at the direct market. CNs and other E–business
platforms, as we start to observe them, increase this probability and attractiveness
of the direct market tremendously. A striking example is the comparison between
garage sales and Internet auctions. Improvements in the mechanisms for direct
marketing increase their market share accordingly.
Our results are also related to those of Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann (2000)
who study multiplicity and indeterminacy in two–sector models with sector–speciﬁc
labor and positive externalities. In their model, individuals diﬀer in productivity
and choose the sector in which they work. Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann
show that enough heterogeneity in agents’ sector–speciﬁc productivity can ensure
uniqueness of the chosen stationary state as it prevents suﬃciently many agents
from changing their choice in reaction to a change in beliefs about the production
of the sectors. This is in line with our result that a suﬃcient mass of traders with
private values below tA ensures a unique equilibrium.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
The proliferation of ATSs such as CNs considerably increases intermarket com-
petition for order ﬂow. While increased competition may be welcomed from the
perspective of market and price eﬃciency, the enhanced choice of trading venues
fragments the order ﬂow and reduces liquidity which is key to the functioning of
ﬁnancial markets. In this paper we presented three models building on the idea that
liquidity–based competition for order ﬂow between DMs and a CN may be under-
stood as a coordination game among traders. We addressed the question whether
and under which circumstances electronic matching markets can co–exist with DMs
or replace them. While in existing models of intermarket competition multiple equi-
libria arise and, therefore, answers to these questions are not deﬁnitive, we have
shown that under certain conditions a unique equilibrium exists that allows clear
answers.
28The models presented diﬀer in the assumptions about traders’ disutility from unex-
ecuted orders or values of immediate trade θ. The ﬁrst game, in which θ is assumed
to be the same for all traders and common knowledge, exhibits multiple equilibria
for most interesting values of trade θ ∈ [tA,θ0]. Here, traders do not only face the
problem of coordinating on the strong equilibrium but coordinating on a Nash equi-
librium at all. Strategy combinations that are no Nash equilibria are not expected
to survive in the long run and mixed equilibria are extremely unstable. Therefore,
we would not expect to observe a CN co–existing with DMs. We found that the
lower the value of trade θ, the easier it is for a CN to intrude the market, with
intrusion being possible for values of θ up to θ0. For θ < θ0, coordination at the CN
is eﬃcient because the cost advantage from trading at the CN is more valuable to
agents than the risk of non–execution which is minimized if all agents go to the CN.
If traders have noisy private information about θ, the set of assets for which multiple
equilibria exist is reduced considerably. We proved existence of a unique equilibrium
in the private information game if θ and signals have uniform distribution. For low
values of θ, uncertainty about the value of trade makes it easier to coordinate on the
CN than in the common knowledge game and, thus, destabilizes a DM monopoly.
For high values of θ, agents trade at the DM. While in the common knowledge game
for high values of θ up to θ0 trading at the CN is a strong equilibrium, in the private
information game uncertainty about θ can prevent intrusion of the CN or even allow
the dealer to win back the market at low cost. Since the probability of dual trading
is very small and approaches zero for small variance of private information, we would
expect to observe both markets co–existing for only a few assets.
In the private value game, values of trade diﬀer across traders. If there are some
traders with private values above θ0 and a suﬃcient mass of traders with private
values below tA ensuring a minimum probability of order execution at the CN, a
unique equilibrium exists such that traders with values of trade below a certain
threshold go to the CN and others go to the DM. Under these conditions, both
markets co–exist.
In the private information game, existence of a unique equilibrium requires that
potential values of θ are distributed widely, such that there exist extreme potential
values for which going to either market is a dominant strategy. Posterior individual
expectations about θ may be arbitrarily close to each other. In the private value
game, however, existence of a unique equilibrium requires that actual private values
θi are distributed widely.
The features of the private value game can be combined with private information
if there is uncertainty about some payoﬀ–relevant variables, aside from θ, such as
the distribution of private values or λ. As we know by now, payoﬀ–uncertainty is
the driving force behind the reduction in the number of equilibria in coordination
29games. However, it remains to be shown which conditions are needed to yield unique
results for such an extended model.
The games presented above provide a broad platform to study intermarket com-
petition for order ﬂow between DMs and a CN. With respect to further research,
we can think of a number of extensions. One may be to make the half–spread tA
endogenous by explicitly considering the DM’s market structure and the dealer’s
cost structure. This would move the critical signal in one or the other direction. If
a dealer quotes her prices based on her expectations about the number of traders,
market microstructure theory suggests that the spread must widen if the expected
number of traders at the DM decreases to ensure coverage of the dealer’s costs.
In a dynamic, multiple–period model, a strategic dealer may lower prices for some
periods in order to re–attract traders. The CN may also set tB strategically, even
with negative values, i.e. it oﬀers little presents or bonus points to attract traders
and gain market share in the beginning. Thus, the introduction of a CN may be
seen as the entry of a competitor into a market that leads to a limitation of existing
dealer(s)’ room to quote prices.
Other possible extensions could analyze alternative market structures, for example
hybrid markets or automatic routing of unexecuted orders from CN to DM. We
believe that this would basically inﬂuence the parameters of the model, transaction
costs at the DM, market thickness and disutilities of unexecuted orders. A hybrid
structure of the DM, in general, decreases the transaction costs diﬀerential which
lowers the critical signal and, thus, reduces the possibility for a CN to enter the
market. Automatic routing lowers the disutility from unexecuted orders θ and makes
it easier for the CN to enter the market.
An important extension of our model would be the implementation of an endogenous
price discovery process as it exists at another type of ATSs; namely ECNs. In this
case, the price at which orders are executed is not taken from a primary exchange
but is derived endogenously, depending on the preferences of the market partici-
pants. For example, an ECN with periodic trading may set prices that maximize
turnover. As a result, only a few orders would be rationed, the probability of order
execution would be close to one and thus, it would be easier to intrude the market.
Alternatively, in a continuous-trading model, buy and sell limit orders are submit-
ted to the ECN and matched. Unexecuted buy and sell limit orders are stored in
the order book and matched against new incoming limit orders. This would require
a dynamic model that discounts the expected utility from order execution in later
periods.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose the probability of a buyer [seller] to get a signal leading her to go to market
B is αb [αs]. Then, the additional number of buyers k has a geometric distribution
with E(k) = αb λ. For a buyer on market B the probability of having k additional
buyers on this market is
pb(k) =
1
1 + αb λ

αb λ
1 + αb λ
k
.
The probability of having r sellers is
ps(r) =
1
1 + αs λ

αs λ
1 + αs λ
r
.
The probability of execution of a buyer’s order, given that there are k additional
buyers and r sellers, is
πb(k,r) =
 r
k+1 if r ≤ k
1 if r > k.
The conditional probability of order execution, given that there are k additional
buyers, is
E(πb |k) =
k X
r=0
r
k + 1
ps(r) + 1 · ps(r > k) =
k X
r=0
r
k + 1
ps(r) + 1 −
k X
r=0
ps(r)
= 1 −
k X
r=0

1 −
r
k + 1

ps(r) = 1 −
1
1 + αs λ
"
k X
r=0
q
r
s −
1
k + 1
k X
r=0
rq
r
s
#
,
where qs := αs λ
1+αs λ. Using
1 − qs =
1
1 + αs λ
,
k X
r=0
q
r =
1 − qk+1
1 − q
and
k X
r=0
rq
r =
q [1 − qk (k + 1 − q k)]
(1 − q)2
31we ﬁnd that
E(πb |k) = q
k+1
s +
αsλ
k + 1

1 − q
k
s (k + 1 − qs k)

= q
k+1
s + αs λ

1 − qk+1
s
k + 1
− q
k
s + q
k+1
s

= q
k+1
s (1 + αs λ) + αs λ

1 − qk+1
s
k + 1
− q
k
s

.
The probability of order execution is
E(πb) =
∞ X
k=0
E(πb |k)pb(k)
=
∞ X
k=0

q
k+1
s (1 + αs λ) + αs λ

1 − qk+1
s
k + 1
− q
k
s

1
1 + αb λ
q
k
b
where qb :=
αb λ
1+αb λ. This equals
1 + αs λ
1 + αb λ
∞ X
k=0
q
k+1
s q
k
b +
αs λ
1 + αb λ
∞ X
k=0

qk
b
k + 1
−
qk+1
s qk
b
k + 1
− q
k
s q
k
b

=
1 + αs λ
1 + αb λ
qs
∞ X
k=0
q
k
s q
k
b +
αs λ
1 + αb λ
"
1
qb
∞ X
k=1
qk
b − qk
s qk
b
k
−
∞ X
k=0
q
k
s q
k
b
#
=
αs
αb
∞ X
k=1
qk
b − qk
s qk
b
k
.
Using
∞ X
k=1
q
k/k = −ln(1 − q)
we ﬁnd that
E(πb) =
αs
αb
[ln(1 − qb qs) − ln(1 − qb)] =
αs
αb
ln
1 + (αs + αb)λ
1 + αs λ
=
αs
αb
ln

1 +
αb λ
1 + αs λ

.
Execution probability for sell orders is calculated accordingly by changing subscripts
b and s. QED
32Proof of Proposition 1
A strategy combination a∗ is a Nash equilibrium iﬀ either
˜ U(θ,α(θ,a
∗)) > 0 ∧ a
∗i(θ,b) = a
∗i(θ,s) = 1 (32)
or ˜ U(θ,α(θ,a
∗)) < 0 ∧ a
∗i(θ,b) = a
∗i(θ,s) = 0 (33)
or ˜ U(θ,α(θ,a
∗)) = 0 (34)
If tB < θ < tA, then ˜ U(θ,α) > 0 for all α. This excludes (33) and (34), while (32)
holds. So, in equilibrium α(θ,a∗) = 1.
If θ = tA, then ˜ U(θ,α) ≥ 0 for all α. This excludes (33). (32) holds, and (34) is
equivalent to ˜ π(α) = 0 ⇔ α(θ,a∗) = 0. There are two equilibria with market shares
of zero and one for the CN.
If θ > tA, (33) holds for all θ > tA. (32) requires (θ − tB) ˜ π(1) > θ − tA, which
is equivalent to θ < θ0. (34) ⇔ (θ − tB) ˜ π(α) = θ − tA ⇔ ˜ π(α) =
θ−tA
θ−tB. ˜ π is a
continuous and increasing function in α reaching from zero to ¯ π. Hence, there is
a unique solution ˜ α(θ) = ˜ π−1

θ−tA
θ−tB

≤ 1 for all θ ≤ θ0. For θ > θ0, there is no
solution to (34) with α ∈ [0,1]. QED
Proof of Theorem 1
For uniform distribution of values of trade and signals and geometric distribution of
market size,
π(θ,Ix) =

 
 
¯ π if θ < x − 
ln

1 +
(x−θ+)λ
2+(x−θ+)λ

if x −  ≤ θ ≤ x + 
0 if θ > x + .
and
˜ U(x,Ix) =
1
2
Z x+
x−
(θ − tB)π(θ,Ix)dθ − x + tA.
Probability π(θ,Ix) depends on the diﬀerence between x and θ and the integral is
evaluated around x. Substituting α for x−θ+
2 , we ﬁnd
˜ U(x,Ix) =
Z 1
0
(x +  − 2α − tB) ˜ π(α)dα − x + tA
33and
˜ U
x
=
Z 1
0
˜ π(α)dα − 1 < 0.
As ˜ U(x,Ix) is strictly decreasing in x, there is a unique x∗ with ˜ U(x∗,Ix∗) = 0. QED
Proof of Corollary 2
From (24), the derivatives of x∗ w.r.t. tA, tB, and λ are obvious. Diﬀerentiating
(24) yields
dx∗
d
=
R 1
0 (1 − 2α) ˜ π(α)dα
R 1
0 (1 − ˜ π(α))dα
.
As ˜ π(α) < 1 for all α ∈ [0,1], the denominator is positive. Splitting the numerator
up, substituting y for 1 − α in the second integral and rearranging terms gives
Z 1
0
(1 − 2α) ˜ π(α)dα =
Z 1/2
0
(1 − 2α) ˜ π(α)dα −
Z 1/2
0
(1 − 2y) ˜ π(1 − y)dy
=
Z 1/2
0
(1 − 2α)[˜ π(α) − ˜ π(1 − α)]dα
=
Z 1/2
0
(1 − 2α) ln
1 + λ + 2α(1 − α)λ2 + αλ
1 + λ + 2α(1 − α)λ2 + (1 − α)λ
dα < 0
For α ∈ [0,1/2] the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Hence, logarithm
and integral are negative. This proofs that x∗ falls with rising . QED
Proof of Corollary 3
Corollaries 1 and 2 imply x∗ < x∗
0. From Theorem 1 we know that ˜ U(x∗,Ix∗) = 0.
˜ U(x
∗,Ix∗) = (x
∗ −  − tB)π
∗ + 2
Z 1
0
(1 − α) ˜ π(α)dα − x
∗ + tA = 0.
34As the integral is positive,
(x
∗ −  − tB)π
∗ − x
∗ + tA < 0 ⇔ x
∗ > x
∗
0 − 
π∗
1 − π∗.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3
The eﬃcient switching point k∗ maximizes E(Ui(Ik)) over k.
E(U
i(Ik)) =
1
ˆ θ − ˇ θ
Z ˆ θ
ˇ θ
F(k|θ)(θ − tB) ˜ π(F(k|θ)) + (1 − F(k|θ))(θ − tA)dθ.
=
1
ˆ θ − ˇ θ
"Z k−
ˇ θ
(θ − tB) ¯ π dθ +
Z ˆ θ
k+
(θ − tA)dθ
+
Z k+
k−
k − θ + 
2
(θ − tB) ˜ π

k − θ + 
2

+
 − k + θ
2
(θ − tA)dθ

=
1
ˆ θ − ˇ θ
"Z k−
ˇ θ
(θ − tB) ¯ π dθ +
Z ˆ θ
k+
(θ − tA)dθ
+2
Z 1
0
α(k +  − 2α − tB) ˜ π(α) + (1 − α)(k +  − 2α − tA)dα,

where we substituted α for k−θ+
2 . If there is an interior optimum k∗, the derivative
dE(Ui(Ik))/dk equals zero at k∗.
dE(Ui(Ik))
dk
=
1
ˆ θ − ˇ θ

(k −  − tB) ¯ π − k −  + tA + 2
Z 1
0
α ˜ π(α) + (1 − α)dα

.
Setting the derivative to zero and solving for k gives (26). QED
Proof of Theorem 2
Given uniform distribution of values of trade and signals, the proof of Theorem 1
shows that ˜ U(x,Ix) is strictly decreasing in x. At the equilibrium switching signal
35˜ U(x∗,Ix∗) = 0. Hence, x∗ < k∗ is equivalent to ˜ U(k∗,Ik∗) < 0. Using (24), (25) and
(26) we ﬁnd
˜ U(k
∗,Ik∗) =
Z 1
0
"
θ0 − 
¯ π − 2
R 1
0 α ˜ π(α)dα
1 − ¯ π
+ (1 − 2α) − tB
#
˜ π(α)dα
−θ0 + 
¯ π − 2
R 1
0 α ˜ π(α)dα
1 − ¯ π
+ tA
= θ0 (π
∗ − 1) − π
∗ tB + tA +
∆
1 − ¯ π
where ∆ = π∗ (1 − 2 ¯ π) + ¯ π − 2(2 − π∗ − ¯ π)
R 1
0 α ˜ π(α)dα. Henceforth, x∗ < k∗ is
equivalent to
∆
1 − ¯ π
< θ0 (1 − π
∗) − tA + π
∗ tB
⇔ ∆ < (tA − ¯ π tB)(1 − π
∗) − (1 − ¯ π)(tA − π
∗ tB) = (tA − tB)(¯ π − π
∗)
Given our assumption that  < tA − tB, a suﬃcient condition for this is
∆ < ¯ π − π
∗
⇔ (1 − ¯ π)π
∗ < (2 − π
∗ − ¯ π)
Z 1
0
α ˜ π(α)dα.
⇐ 2(1 − ¯ π) < 2 − π
∗ − ¯ π ∧
π∗
2
<
Z 1
0
α ˜ π(α)dα.
⇔ −¯ π < −π
∗ ∧
Z 1
0
˜ π(α)dα < 2
Z 1
0
α ˜ π(α)dα.
⇔ ¯ π > π
∗ ∧
Z 1
0
(1 − 2α) ˜ π(α)dα < 0.
36These inequalities follow from monotonicity of ˜ π. The second has been proved above
in Corollary 2. QED
Proof of Lemma 3
Let a∗ be a Nash equilibrium of the private value game. ai∗(b) = 1[0] if ˜ Ub(θi,a∗) >
[<] 0 and ai∗(s) = 1[0] if ˜ Us(θi,a∗) > [<] 0. ˜ Ub(θi,a) and ˜ Us(θi,a) are positive for
θi < tA and negative for θi > θ0 for all a. As ˜ Ub and ˜ Us are strictly decreasing in
θi, there are a θ∗
b(a∗) and a θ∗
s(a∗), such that ai∗(b) = 1[0] if θi < [>]θ∗
b(a∗) and
ai∗(s) = 1[0] if θi < [>]θ∗
s(a∗).
Suppose θ∗
b(a) < θ∗
s(a). Then αb(a) < αs(a), and πb(a) > πs(a). Then ˜ Ui
b(a) > ˜ Ui
s(a)
for all i. This implies θ∗
b(a) > θ∗
s(a) which is a contradiction to the inequality above.
Hence, θ∗
b(a) = θ∗
s(a). QED
Proof of Theorem 3
Since ˆ U(θ) is continuous and positive for θ < tA and negative for θ > θ0, it is
suﬃcient to show that in equilibrium ˆ U is strictly decreasing.
dˆ U(θ)
dθ
= ˜ π(F(θ)) − 1 + (θ − tB)
∂˜ π
∂α
f(θ). (35)
For geometric distribution of the number of buyers and sellers and uniform distri-
bution of private values,
dˆ U(θ)
dθ
= ˜ π(α) − 1 +
θ − tB
ˆ θ − tB
λ
(1 + 2αλ)(1 + αλ)
.
θ−tB
ˆ θ−tB = α and in equilibrium ˜ π(α) =
θ−tA
θ−tB.
dˆ U(θ)
dθ
    
θ∗
=
θ − tA
θ − tB
− 1 +
αλ
1 + 3αλ + 2α2 λ2 = −
tA − tB
θ − tB
+
αλ
1 + 3αλ + 2α2 λ2.
dˆ U(θ)
dθ
  
 
θ∗
< 0 ⇔
tA − tB
ˆ θ − tB
>
θ − tB
ˆ θ − tB
αλ
1 + 3αλ + 2α2 λ2
⇔ (1 + 3αλ + 2α
2 λ
2)
tA − tB
ˆ θ − tB
> α
2 λ
37⇐ 2α
2 λ
2 tA − tB
ˆ θ − tB
≥ α
2 λ ⇔
tA − tB
ˆ θ − tB
λ ≥
1
2
.
QED
Proof of Theorem 4
The eﬃcient threshold θ∗∗ maximizes (over k)
E(U(θ
i,ak)) =
Z k
tB
f(θ)(θ − tB) ˜ π(F(k))dθ +
Z ˆ θ
k
f(θ)(θ − tA)dθ.
The ﬁrst order condition implies
(θ
∗∗ − tB) ˜ π(F(θ
∗∗)) +
Z θ∗∗
ˇ θ
f(θ)(θ − tB) ˜ π
0(·)dθ − θ
∗∗ + tA = 0. (36)
In equilibrium ˆ U(θ∗) = 0. If there is a unique equilibrium θ∗, the derivative of ˆ U is
negative at equilibrium. Therefore, θ∗ < θ∗∗ if and only if ˆ U(θ∗∗) < 0. (30) and (36)
imply
ˆ U(θ
∗∗) = (θ
∗∗ − tB) ˜ π(F(θ
∗∗)) − θ
∗∗ + tA = −
Z θ∗∗
ˇ θ
f(θ)(θ − tB) ˜ π
0(·)dθ < 0.
QED
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